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Nicholas Economides 
T HE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS sector is going through a significant change. A number of factors contribute and define this change. The first is the rapid technological change in key inputs of telecommunications 
and computer-based services and in complementary goods, which have drama- 
tically reduced the costs of traditional telecommunications services and have 
made many new services available at reasonable prices. For example, tele- 
communications cost reductions have made access to the Internet affordable 
to the general public. 
The second reason for the revolutionary change has been the sweeping 
digitization of the telecommunications and the related sectors. Not only has the 
underlying telecommunications technology become digital, but the consumer 
and business telecommunications interfaces have become more versatile and 
closer to multifunction computers than to traditional telephones. Digitization 
and integration of telecommunications services with computers create signifi- 
cant business opportunities, impose significant pressure on traditional pricing 
structures, especially in voice telephony, and threaten the fundamental features 
of the traditional regulatory regime. 
The third reason for the current upheaval in the telecommunications sec- 
tor was the passage of an important new law to govern telecommunications in 
the United States, the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Telecommunications 
has traditionally been subject to a complex federal and state regulatory struc- 
ture. The 1996 act attempted to adapt the regulatory structure to technologi- 
cal reality, but various legal challenges by the incumbents have so far delayed, 
if not nullified, its impact. 
In general, regulation should be used only when it is clear that deregulated 
markets are likely to fail even in the presence of reasonably strict antitrust en- 
forcement. Clearly, the success or failure of a market in the absence of regula- 
tion depends crucially on the demand and cost conditions under the present 
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technology. Progress and innovation in telecommunications technologies have 
been rapid for the past forty years and are expected to continue at a fast pace. 
As a result of technological change, cost conditions shift considerably over time 
and can transform a market that requires regulation into one that does not. This 
is crucial for telecommunications and has lead to progressive deregulation. For 
example, the market for long-distance telecommunications services, starting as 
a near monopoly in the mid-1970s, was formally completely deregulated in 
1995, after strong competition in the 1980s and early 1990s emerged follow- 
ing the breakup of American Telegraph and Telephone (AT&T) in 1984 and 
the opening of the long-distance market to competition. However, the process 
of deregulating some services while other services (often produced by the same 
f m s )  remain regulated is a complicated task with many pitfalls. Given the com- 
plex incentives of firrns that participate in many markets and often face com- 
petitors who participate in just a few, it would be foolish to proceed with 
complete deregulation of the telecom sector without a careful analysis. 
Telecommunications services are based on an increasingly sophisticated 
and complex network able to produce a rich variety of services that differ in 
distance traveled, quality, amount and nature of data or voice transmitted per 
unit of time, requirement of immediate (real-time) delivery, and so on. Making 
effective use of elements of market organization in many telecommunications 
contexts often requires considerable and detailed regulation. Many times, 
these regulations, even if they work well for existing markets, have pretty poor 
results when applied to markets for new products. This lack of flexibility of 
regulation is particularly important in modern telecommunications because 
new telecommunications services are continually produced, helped by the avail- 
ability of complementary goods and services. For example, the demand for 
low-level data transmission as required by the World Wide Web and the In- 
ternet would not be possible without the wide availability and low prices of 
computers. But it would be foolish to start applying the traditional regulatory 
framework to the Internet, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has correctly understood this. 
Finally, telecommunications regulation is hampered by the various exi- 
gencies of regulation in general, such as political intervention and lobbying. 
Political intervention is complicated because some telecommunications ser- 
vices (such as access to emergency services) are essential for all and others, 
such as basic service, are considered necessities. 
A number of factors drive the U.S. telecommunications industry today: 
dramatic and continuing reductions in the costs of transmission and switching 
digitization 
the 1984 breakup of AT&T's monopoly, resulting in a competitive long- 
distance service sector and a monopolized local telecommunications sector 
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restructuring of the regulatory environment through the implementation of 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act, twelve years after the breakup of AT&T 
the move of value from underlying services (such as transmission and 
switching) to interfaces and content 
the move toward multifunction programmable devices with programmable 
interfaces, such as computers, and away from single-function, nonprogram- 
mable consumer devices, such as traditional telephone appliances 
. reallocation of electromagnetic spectrum, allowing for expanded wireless 
services interconnection and interoperability of interconnected networks 
standardization of communications protocols 
the existence of network effects whereby connection to a large network is 
more valuable for each customer, and the fact that small networks unable 
to reach critical mass are unlikely to survive 
These, in turn, have a number of consequences: 
increasing pressure for cost-based pricing of telecommunications services 
price arbitrage between services of the same time immediacy requirement 
increasing competition in long-distance services 
the possibility of competition in local services 
the emergence of Internet telephony (voice-over Internet protocol [VOW]) 
as a major new telecommunications technology 
Have Telecommunications Regulation? 
To answer the question, "Why have telecommunications regulation?" one 
must first answer the question, "Why have regulation in general?" The logic 
of competition law in the United States is that efficiency (allocative, produc- 
tive, and dynamic) is the desired outcome of antitrust policy, and competition 
is the means of achieving it. Thus antitrust laws are used to guard against re- 
strictions on competition. Economic regulation has been established as a last 
resort for those markets where it is clear that competitive outcomes cannot be 
achieved by market forces;' where deviation from economic efficiency is 
deemed socially desirable; where the social and private benefits are clearly 
different, including cases in which minimum safety standards increase social 
welfare; and to allow for coordination in technical standards or market equi- 
l ibr ium~.~ Telecommunications can qualify under all four of these criteria as 
an industry in which some form of regulation is appropriate. 
The main reason proposed for regulating telecommunications has been 
that a desirable competitive outcome could not be aclxeved by market forces. 
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In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, AT&T, after many of its patents had expired, faced sigmf- 
icant competition in local telecommunications by independent telephone com- 
panies. The independents typically started at the local level and wired many 
businesses and households in small and midsize towns, sometimes also creat- 
ing regional long-distance networks. There were periods in the first decade of 
the twentieth century when independents had in total more local lines than 
AT&T, although the near monopoly of AT&T in long distance was never se- 
riously challenged until the 1970s. AT&T refused to interconnect with the in- 
dependents, forcing many businesses to subscribe to two telephone companies 
with disconnected and incompatible networks, an independent to reach local 
customers (mainly households) and AT&T to reach  supplier^.^ 
AT&T stated that it was concerned with the quality standards of inde- 
pendents and offered to incorporate most of them in the Bell System, but 
clearly there were also business and strategic reasons behind AT&T7s refusal 
to interconnect. The benefit to an independent telephone company of access 
to the AT&T long-distance network was much larger than the benefit to 
AT&T of adding to its network the mostly'residential customers of an inde- 
pendent. Although not clearly articulated in network economics terms, the 
issue facing the independents and AT&T was clearly a fundamental issue in 
network economics. Modern network economics teaches us that the incentives 
of firms of different sizes to interconnect differ depending on the value and 
size of the new demand that is created by interconnection (Economides 1991 ; 
1996). Typically, a large and high-value network has a significantly smaller 
incentive to interconnect with a smaller, low-value network than the smaller 
one has to interconnect with the larger one. This can easily lead to a refusal 
by the larger, high-value network to interconnect. 
In summary, market incentives led AT&T to refuse to interconnect with 
smaller (local and long-distance) networks, though such interconnection was 
considered socially desirable. This was the first reason for which regulation at 
the federal and state levels was imposed with a requirement to interconnect 
public switched telecommunications networks."here were clearly some ser- 
vice markets in the time period leading to the 1930s in which only one firm 
could survive. Monopoly prices in general are predicted to be high, and 
AT&T7s long-distance prices during t h s  period were high. This gave a fur- 
ther justification to regulation, since free entry was unlikely to increase the 
number of competitors in many service markets. 
The second and third reasons for regulation (deviation from social effi- 
ciency being desirable and a difference between the social and private value 
of telecommunications) were generally articulated after regulation was already 
in place. In the 1960s regulators did not let prices of basic local service rise in 
their attempt to achieve "universal service," that is, to include as many house- 
holds as possible in the telecommunications network, on the basis that this 
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was desirable even if it were allocatively inefficient. The ability of customers 
to receive calls and make emergency calls also played a role in setting the 
goal of universal service. Basic telecommunications service is now consid- 
ered a necessity, and its inexpensive and ubiquitous provision is guaranteed 
by reg~lat ion.~ 
The fourth reason for regulation, that the regulator can help the industry 
achieve technical compatibility and avoid fragmentation, has had only limited 
application to telecommunications. Clearly, technical compatibility in a net- 
work industry is important since it allows all users to get the full benefits of 
the combined networks rather than the benefits of only the one they subscribe 
to. In practice, the present de facto compatibility standards in voice transmis- 
sion and in higher data protocols are largely the legacy of the pre- 1984 AT&T 
monopoly and the adoption of Internet protocols that were created with gov- 
ernment subsidization, with the requirement that they be made public. The 
regulatory requirements are typically on interconnection and at the level of 
voice transmission. There is no regulatory requirement of compatibility in 
many areas, including wireless equipment, wireless text messaging, higher 
data protocols, and  interface^.^ 
In understanding telecommunications regulation in the United States, it 
is useful to keep in mind the particular factors that made regulation the ap- 
propriate policy answer at some point in time. As technology and population 
densities change, some markets that may have been natural monopolies in the 
past may not be natural monopolies any more, and it may be better to allow 
competition in those markets while keeping regulation in the rest. The ques- 
tion of the desirability of regulation in various markets has been asked re- 
peatedly over time, resulting in the present regime of progressive deregulation. 
The public interest objective of telecommunications regulation is vague. 
Most economists agree that a valid'objective is to increase total surplus, that is, 
consumers' surplus plus profits of active firms. Most economists also agree that 
the public interest should promote innovation and growth. Although it is diffi- 
cult to quantify the exact effect of innovation and growth on income, there is 
wide consensus that these should be promoted and are part of the public inter- 
es t. Finally, the public interest may include subsidization of telecommunications 
services that are considered necessities, such as basic local service, or those that 
are deemed to increase productivity and growth, such as Internet access. Given 
the vagueness of the concept of the public interest, various groups lobby politi- 
cians and regulators to include their objectives as part of the public interest. This 
rent-seeking behavior sometimes leads to teiecommunications regulators to 
impose policies that have little to do with telecommunications markets. 
Having outlined the potential benefits of regulation, I should also note 
that there are significant drawbacks and costs created by regulation. First, reg- 
ulators generally do not have the latest technological information. In an in- 
dustry with fast technological change, such as telecommunications, this can 
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lead to significant divergence between costs and prices as costs fall much 
faster than prices. This has happened consistently both in the old regulated 
AT&T and in regulated local-exchange carriers. Second, regulated firms may 
be able to use the regulatory setup to create barriers to entry and thereby per- 
petuate their profitable existence. For example, the first application of MCI to 
provide switched long-distance service was rejected by the FCC; MCI had to 
sue and was allowed in long-distance service only after a court decision. 
Third, the regulatory setup is slow, cumbersome, bureaucratic, and, in many 
cases, politically influenced. In practice, the regulatory system is much easier 
to influence by politicians than the judicial system. Fourth, because of the pub- 
lic interest provision, there can be significant rent-seeking activity by various 
groups, especially in issues relating to mergers that have strict, externally im- 
posed deadlines. Fifth, in an industry with fast technical change, it is hard to 
define the appropriate array of regulated products; and new and evolving prod- 
ucts are difficult to regulate correctly. Thus regulation should be used spar- 
ingly, and only when there are no good alternatives. 
A new problem in regulatory supervision has been added with the recent 
aggressive intervention of the Competition Committee of the European Union 
in telecommunications matters. The European Union intervened in the merg- 
ers of MCI and WorldCom and of WorldCom with Sprint. This has created a 
situation in which large telecommunications companies contemplating a merger 
have to argue their case in front of the United States Department of Justice, 
the European Union Competition Committee, the public utilities commissions 
in fifty states, and other foreign regulatory bodies. This not only adds to the 
complexity and the cost of the merger but also creates the possibility that the 
requirements imposed by different regulatory bodies will contradict one an- 
other, and it would not be feasible to meet all of them. It also creates the pos- 
sibility that conditions in financial markets may change considerably between 
the time a merger is announced and the time it is consummated, so that one of 
the merging parties may not find the merger desirable at the later date and may 
use a regulatory objection to abandon the merger without penalties. This in- 
creases the incentives of private parties opposing a merger to intervene, at- 
tempting to lengthen the approval process in hope that financial conditions 
may change during the approval process. 
U.S. Telecommunications Regulation 
Telecommunications has traditionally been a regulated sector of the U.S. 
economy. The market for telecommunication services and equipment went 
through various stages of competition after the invention of the telephone by 
Alexander Graham Bell. Regulation was imposed in the early part of this cen- 
tury and remains today in various parts of the ~ e c t o r . ~  
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The Period of AT&T1s Near Monopoly 
Following a period of expansion and consolidation, by the 1920s AT&T had 
an overwhelming majority of telephony exchanges and submitted to state reg- 
ulation. Federal regulation was instituted by the 1934 Telecommunications 
Act, which established the Federal Communications Commi+ssion. In its hey- 
day, from the 1930s to 1981, AT&T dominated all aspects of telecommuni- 
cations in the United States. It had approximately 90 percent market share of 
local access lines and more than 90 percent of the long-distance revenue. It 
used almost exclusively equipment of Western Electric, its equipment divi- 
sion. It owned a top research laboratory, Bell Laboratories, which conducted 
both applied and theoretical research. Crucial scientific inventions of the twen- 
tieth century, such as the transistor and the integrated circuit, occurred at Bell 
Laboratories. By the 1970s, AT&T had achieved universal service-more 
than 90 percent of U.S. households had a telephone-and it kept improving 
the quality of its services. 
Regulation of the U.S. telecommunications market was marked by two 
important antitrust lawsuits that the U.S. Department of Justice brought against 
AT&T and the Bell System. In the first one, United States v. Western Electric, 
filed in 1949, the U.S. Department of Justice claimed that the Bell operating 
companies practiced illegal exclusion by buying both production equipment 
and customer premises equipment (telephone appliances and switchboards) 
only from Western Electric, a part of the Bell System. The government sought 
a divestiture of Western Electric, but the case was settled in 1956, with AT&T 
agreeing not to enter the computer market but retaining ownership of Western 
Electric. The second major antitrust suit, United States v. AT&T, was started 
in 1974. The government alleged the following: 
that AT&T's exclusive relationship with Western Electric was illegal 
that AT&T monopolized the long-distance service market 
that AT&T refused to interconnect telecommunications competitors as well 
as customers' premises equipment, thus being liable for a "refusal to deal" 
that AT&T used various discriminatory practices that raised the costs of 
competitors 
that AT&T abused the regulatory process and did not provide complete in- 
formation to regulators 
that AT&T set prices to exclude competitors, including practicing pred- 
a t03  pricing 
The Department of Justice sought divestiture of both manufacturing and 
long-&stance service from local se rv i~e .~  Late in the Carter administration, 
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the department offered to accept only the divestiture of manufacturing. AT&T 
refused and later had to accept a much more onerous breakup. The case was 
settled by the modified final judgment in 1984. AT&T retained its long-&stance 
network, but seven regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) were broken 
away from it.9 Each RBOC comprised a collection of local telephone cornpa- 
nies that were part of the original AT&T. Regional Bell operating companies 
remained regulated monopolies, each with an exclusive franchise in its region, 
and were not allowed to provide long-distance service. 
Microwave transmission was a major breakthrough in long-distance 
transmission that created the possibility of competition in long distance. Micro- 
wave transmission was followed by technological breakthroughs in transrnis- 
sion through satellite and fiber-optic wire. By the time competition took root 
in long distance, fiber-optic technology had become the dominant technology 
of transmission. 
The Postbreakup Years 
The breakup of AT&T crystallized the recognition that competition was pos- 
sible in long distance while the local market remained a natural monopoly 
(see, for example, Crandall 1991). The biggest benefits to consumers during 
the past eighteen years have come from the long-distance market, which was 
transformed during this period from a monopoly to an effectively competitive 
market. However, consumers often do not reap the full benefits of cost reduc- 
tions and competition because of an antiquated regulatory framework that, 
ironically, was supposed to protect consumers from monopolistic abuses and 
instead sometimes protects the monopolistic market structure. 
Competition in long distance has been a great success. The m-aket share 
(in minutes of use) of AT&T fell from almost 85 percent in 1984 to barely 
50 percent in 1998, as shown in figure 3.1, and presently below 45 percent. 
The revenue market share of AT&T, shown in figure 3.2, also fell dramati- 
cally. Since the 1984 modified final judgment, the number of competitors in 
the long-distance market has increased dramatically. Soon after the judgment, 
two nationwide facilities-based competitors, MCI and Sprint, emerged as 
strong competitors of AT&T. Facilities-based competitors deployed their own 
fiber-optic switched network. Over the past decade, a number of new strong 
facilities-based competitors entered with nationwide (or significant-coverage) 
networks, including Qwest, Level 3, Williams, and Global Crossing-lo There 
are also a number of smaller regional facilities-based carriers as well as a large 
number of "resellers" that buy wholesale service from the facilities-based 
long-distance carriers and sell to consumers. For example, there are currently 
about five hundred resellers competing in the California interexchange mar- 
ket, providing strong evidence for the ease of entry into this market. At least 
twenty new finns have entered the California market in each year since 1984. 
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Prices of long-distance phone calls have decreased dramatically. The av- 
erage revenue per minute of AT&T's switched services was reduced by 62 per- 
cent between 1984 and 1996. Figure 3.3 shows the average revenue per minute 
for AT&T relative to 1984 (upper line) as well as the average revenue per 
\- minute for AT&T net of access charges relative to 1984 (lower line).ll The 
FCC declared AT&T "nondominant" in the long-distance market in 1995 (FCC 
1995). Most economists agree that presently the long-distance market is effec- 
tively competitive. - 
The modified final judgment did not allow the RBOCs to provide "in- 
region" long-distance phone service: that is, each RBOC was prohibited from 
offering long-distance service that originated in its local area. The main rea- 
sons for that restriction were to avoid three types of anticompetitive actions 
by a local service monopolist that would also own a long-distance service sub- 
sidiary: vertical price squeeze, price discrimination against the opponents of 
the local monopolist's long-distance subsidiary, and nonprice discrimination 
against the opponents of the local monopolist's long-distance subsidiary. 
A long-distance phone call is carried by the local telephone companies of 
the place it originates and the place it terminates, and only in its long-distance 
part by a long-distance company. Originating access and terminating access 
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are provided by local-exchange carriers to long-distance companies and are es- 
sential bottleneck inputs for long-&stance service. A local-exchange monop- 
olist sets a per minute originating fee (a) paid by all long-distance companies 
for calls originating from its region. Origination and termination fees are ap- 
proved by the state public utility cornmis~ion.~~ If the local-exchange monop- 
olist also provides long-distance service, it can influence the,maximum price 
per minute (p) that an independent long-distance company can charge. Thus a 
local-exchange monopolist that has vertically integrated in long-distance ser- 
vice can control the gross revenue per minute (p - a) of its long-distance rivals. 
By setting its long-distance price and influencing the access charge, the verti- 
cally integrated local-exchange monopolist can squeeze or even make nega- 
tive the gross per minute revenue (p - a) of the long-distance rivals so that they 
are marginalized or even driven out of business. This is called a "vertical price 
squeeze." A local-exchange monopolist with a long-&stance subsidiary can 
also use price and nonprice discrimination against long-distance competitors 
to disadvantage them (see Economides 2003; Economides, Lopomo, and 
Woroch 1996; Economides and White 1995; Faulhaber 2004). Thus to insu- 
late long-distance competition from leveraging in the long-distance market of 
the RBOC monopoly power in the local exchange and to protect the public 
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interest, the 1984 modified final judgment restricted the RBOCs from provid- 
ing in-region long-distance service.13 
Local telephone companies that came out of the Bell System (RBOCs) 
actively petitioned the U.S. Congress to be allowed to enter the long-distance 
market. To a large extent in response to this pressure, Congress passed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The great success of competition in long 
distance allowed Congress to appear balanced in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 by establishing competition in local telephony while allowing RBOCs 
into long distance after they had met certain conditions. However, the transi- 
tion of local markets to effective competition will not be as easy or as quick 
as it was in the long-distance markets. This is because of the nature of the 
product and the associated economics. 
Many telecommunications companies are presently trying to be in as 
many markets as possible so that they can bundle the various products. Com- 
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panies believe that consumers are willing to pay more for bundled services for 
which the consumer receives a single bill. Bundling also discourages con- 
sumers from migrating to competitors, who may not offer the complete col- 
lection of services, so that consumer "chum" is reduced. 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Its Impact 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 attempted a major restructuring of the 
U.S. telecommunications sector. The act will be judged favorably to the ex- 
tent that it allows and facilitates the acquisition by consumers of the benefits 
of technological advances. Such a function requires the promotion of compe- 
tition in all markets. This does not mean immediate and complete deregula- 
tion. Consumers must be protected from monopolistic abuses in some markets 
as long as such abuses are feasible under the current market structure, which 
was in many ways determined by the legacy of regulation. Moreover, the reg- 
ulatory framework must safeguard against firms exporting their monopoly 
power in other markets. 
In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress took radical 
steps to restructure U.S. telecommunications markets. These steps had the 
potential to result in significant benefits to consumers of telecommunications 
services, telecommunications carriers, and telecommunications equipment 
manufacturers. But the degree of success of the act depends crucially on its im- 
plementation through decisions of the FCC and state public utility commissions 
and the outcome of the various court challenges that these decisions face. 
The 1996 act envisioned a network of interconnected networks that are 
composed of complementary components and generally provide both com- 
peting and complementary services. The act used both structural and behav- 
ioral instruments to accomplish its goals. It attempted to reduce regulatory 
barriers to entry and competition. It outlawed artificial barriers to entry in 
local-exchange markets in an effort to accomplish the maximum possible 
competition. Moreover, it mandated interconnection of telecommunications 
networks, unbundling, nondiscrimination, and cost-based pricing of leased 
parts of the network, so that competitors can enter easily and compete com- 
ponent by component and service by service. 
The act imposed conditions to ensure that de facto monopoly power 
would not be exported to vertically related markets. Thus it required that com- 
petition be established in local markets before the incumbent local-exchange 
carriers would be allowed in long distance. It preserved subsidized local ser- 
vice to achieve universal service but imposed the requirement that subsidiza- 
tion be transparent and that subsidies be raised in a competitively neutral 
manner. Thus it led the way to the elimination of subsidization of universal 
service through the traditional method of high access charges. 
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It crystallized changes that had become necessary because of technolog- 
ical progress. Rapid technological change has always been the original cause 
of regulatory change. The radical transformation of the regulatory environ- 
ment and market conditions that is presently taking place as a result of the 
1996 act is no exception. 
Logic of the Act 
The logic behind the 1996 act was essentially to break the network into com- 
ponents and let everyone compete in every part, as well as in end-to-end ser- 
vices. To achieve this, the act mandates interconnection, unbundling, and 
nondiscrimination. Moreover, it takes away some of the incumbent's advan- 
tages that arise purely from historical reasons by mandating the lease of un- 
bundled network elements at cost, mandating wholesale provision of any 
service presently provided by the incumbent local exchange carriers, and im- 
posing phone number portability. To preserve the competition in long dis- 
tance, the act attempted to ensure that monopoly power arising from historical 
or other reasons in the local exchange is not exported in other markets. Finally, 
it attempted to impose nationwide standards for competition and take some 
regulatory power away from the states. 
The 1996 Act allows entry of RBOCs in long distance after they open 
their local-exchange networks to competition. Thus from the point of view of 
an RBOC, entry into long-distance service provision was supposed to be the 
reward for allowing competition in the local exchange and losing its local- 
exchange monopoly. The act was based on the belief that the individual pri- 
vate incentives of the RBOCs would be sufficient to drive the process. Thus 
it did not impose penalties for delay or noncompliance. This has proved to be 
a serious deficiency. Co~gress thought that the "carrot" of entry in long dis- 
tance would be sufficient reward for RBOCs to open their local networks. 
Events have shown that Congress erred in this; RBOCs' behavior showed that 
they were-willing to pay the price of staying out of long distance for a while 
rather than open their local networks. 
Entry in Local Services as 
Envisioned by the Act 
At the time of ths  writing, the "last mile" of the telecommunications network 
that is closest to the consumer (the "local loop") still remains a bottleneck con- 
trolled by a local-exchange carrier. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
boldly attempted to introduce competition into this last bottleneck, and, be- 
fore competition took hold, to imitate competition in the local exchange. 
To facilitate entry in the local exchange, the act introduced two novel 
ways of entry other than through the installation of owned facilities. The first 
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allowed entry in the retailing part of the telecommunications business by re- 
quiring incumbent local-exchange carriers to sell to entrants at wholesale 
prices any retail service that they offer. Such entry is essentially limited to the 
retailing part of the market. 
The second and most significant novel way was through the leasing of 
unbundled network elements from incumbents. In particular, the 1996 Act re- 
quired that incumbent local-exchange carriers unbundle their networks and 
offer for lease to entrants network components (unbundled network elements) 
at prices "based on cost" (sect. 252[d][l][a] [i]) that "may include a reasonable 
profit" (sect. 252[d][2]) and be "nondiscrirninatory" (sect. 252[d] [1] [a][ii]).14 
Thus it envisioned the telecommunications network as a decentralized net- 
work of interconnected networks.15 
Many finns, including the large interexchange carriers AT&T and MCI- 
worldcorn,-attempted to enter the market through "arbitration" agreements 
with incumbent local-exchange carriers under the supervision of state regula- 
tory commissions, according to the procedure outlined by the act. The arbi- 
tration process proved to be extremely long and difficult, with continuous legal 
obstacles and appeals raised by the incumbent local-exchange carriers. To 
date, more than eight years after the signing of the act by President Bill Clinton, 
entry in the local exchange has been limited in most residential markets. 
As of June 2003, entrant competitive local-exchange carriers provided ser- 
vice to 14.7 percent of the approximately 183 million local telephone lines na- 
tionwide (FCC 2003c, sec. 8, table 6), but only 3.4 psrcent of end users were 
served over facilities owned by competitive local-exchange carriers.16 Forty-two 
percent of all competitive local-exchange carriers7 lines served medium and 
large business, institutional customers, and government customers. l7 For ser- 
vices provided over leased facilities, the percentage of service by competitive 
local-exchange carriers, which is total service resale of services by incumbent 
local-exchange carriers, declined to 19 percent at the end of December 2002, 
while the percentage provisioned over acquired unbundled-network-element 
loops grew to 55 percent. 
Entry of RBOCs in Long-Distance 
Service 
In 1996 RBOCs had 89 percent of telephone access lines nationwide. Most of 
the remainder belonged to GTE and independent franchse holders. Competitive 
access providers (who did not hold a franchise monopoly) had less than 1 per- 
cent of all residential access lines nationwide. Besides providing access to long- 
distance companies, local-exchange carriers also provide lucrative custom 
local-exchange services such as call waiting, conference calling, and automatic 
number identification. Basic local service provided by local-exchange carriers 
is considered not to be particularly profitable. 
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The act allowed for entry of RBOCs in long distance once a list of re- 
quirements had been met and the petitioner had proved that its proposal is in 
the public interest. These requirements are supposed to be met only when the 
market for local telecommunications services becomes sufficiently competi- 
tive. If the local market is not competitive when a monopolist incumbent 
local-exchange carrier enters into long distance, the local-exchange,carrier can 
leverage its monopoly power to disadvantage its long-distance rivals by in- 
creasing their costs in various ways and by discriminating against them in its 
pricing. If the local market is not competitive when a monopolist incumbent 
local-exchange carrier enters into long distance, an incumbent local-exchange 
carrier (ILEC) controls the price of a required input (switched access) to long- 
distance service while competing for customers in long distance. Under these 
circumstances, an ILEC can implement a vertical price squeeze on its long- 
distance competitors whereby the price-to-cost ratio of long-distance com- 
petitors becomes so low that they are driven out of business.18 
In allowing entry of local-exchange carriers into the long-distance market, 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act tried not to endanger competition that has 
developed in long distance by premature entry of RBOCs in the long-distance 
market. However, on this issue, the act's provisions guarding against premature 
entry may have been insufficient. Hence, to guard against anticompetitive con- 
sequences of premature entry of RBOCs in long distance there is need for a 
deeper analysis of the consequences of such entry on competition and on con- 
sumers' and social welfare. The FCC has not demanded significant competition 
before allowing RBOCs to enter long distance, and RBOCs are currently ap- 
proved for long-distance service in all states. The history of the approval pro- 
cess is summarized in table 3.1 (see also FCC 2003b). 
Universal Service 
Traditionally, the United States has adopted a policy to maximize the sub- 
scribership of the public switched telecommunications network, commonly 
called universal service. Because universal service reauires that some con- 
I 
sumers be provided with basic telephone services below cost, from an effi- 
ciency standpoint there is overconsumption of those services. Most studies 
report very small price elasticities of demand for access, so the overconsump- 
tion effect may be small, and most of the distortion caused by universal ser- 
vice may be a wealth transfer effect. However, depending on how universal 
service is structured and provided, a host of other inefficiencies may also be 
created. 
Historically, attaining the goal of universal service has focused on keeping 
basic rates for local-exchange telephone service low. To achieve this goal, the 
funds required to subsidize service were extracted from inter- and intra-LATA 
(local access transport area) long-distance service. Thus rates for carrier access 
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TABLE 3.1 FCC Approval of L ocal-Exchange Carriers info the 
L ong-Distance Market, 7 997 fo 2003 
State Filed by Status Date Filed Date Resolved 
Arizona 
Illinois, Indiana, 
Ohio, Wisconsin 
Michigan 
Qwest 
SBC 
Approved 
Approved 
September 4,2003 
July 17,2003 
December 3,2003 
October 15.2003 
SBC Approved June 19,2003 Due by 
September 17,2003 
June 26,2003 
April 16, 2003 
April 15,2003 
Qwest 
SBC 
Qwest 
Approved 
Withdrawn 
Approved 
February 28,2003 
January 15,2003 
January 15,2003 
Minnesota 
Michigan 
New Mexico, 
Oregon, 
South Dakota 
Nevada 
District of Columbia, 
Maryland, 
West Virginia 
Colorado, Idaho, 
Iowa, Montana, 
Nebraska, 
North Dakota, 
Utah, Washington, 
Wyoming 
California 
Florida, Tennessee 
Virginia 
Montana, Utah, 
Washington, 
Wyoming 
New Hampshire, 
Delaware 
Alabama, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, 
North Carolina, 
South Carolina 
Colorado, Idaho, 
Iowa, Nebraska, 
North Dakota 
New Jersey 
Maine 
Georgia, Louisiana 
Vermont 
New Jersey 
Rhode Island 
Georgia, Louisiana 
Arkansas, Missouri 
Pennsylvania 
Connecticut 
SBC 
Verizon 
Approved 
Approved 
January 14,2003 
December 18.2002 
April 14,2003 
March 19,2003 
Qwest Approved September 30,2002 December 23,2002 
SBC 
Bells outh 
Verizon 
Qwest 
Approved 
Approved 
Approved 
Withdrawn 
September 20,2002 
September 20,2002 
August 1,2002 
July 12,2002 
December 19,2002 
December 19,2002 
October 30,2002 
September 10, 2002 
Verizon Approved June 27,2002 
June 20,2002 
September 25, 2002 
BellSouth Approved September 18,2002 
Qwest 
. ~. 
Withdrawn June 13,2002 September 10,2002 
Verizon 
Verizon 
BellSouth 
Verizon 
Verizon 
Verizon 
BellSouth 
SBC 
Verizon 
Verizon 
Approved 
Approved 
Approved 
Approved 
Withdrawn 
Approved 
Withdrawn 
Approved 
Approved 
Approved 
March 26,2002 
March 21,2002 
February 14,2002 
January 17,2002 
December 20,2001 
, November 26,2001 
October 2,2001 
August 20,200 1 
June 2 1,200 1 
April 23,2001 
June 24,2002 
June 19,2002 
May 15,2002 
April 17,2002 
March-20,2002 
February 24,2002 
December 20,2001 
November 16,2001 
September 19, 2001 
July 20,2001 
(Table continues on p. 64.) 
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TABLE 3.1 Continued 
State Filed by Status Date Filed Date Resolved 
Missouri 
Massachusetts 
Kansas, Oklahoma 
Massachusetts 
Texas 
Texas 
New York 
Louisiana 
Louisiana 
South Carolina 
Michigan 
Oklahoma 
Michigan 
SBC 
Verizon 
SBC 
Verizon 
SBC 
SBC . 
Verizon 
BellSouth ,- 
BellSouth 
BellSouth 
Arneritech 
SBC 
Ameritech 
Withdrawn 
Approved 
Approved. 
Withdrawn 
Approved 
Withdrawn 
Approved 
Denied 
Denied 
Denied 
Denied 
Denied 
Withdrawn 
April 4,2001 
January 16,2001 
October 26, 2000 
September 22,2000 
April 5,2000 
January 10,2000 
September 29, 1999 
July 9, 1998 
November 6, 1997 
September 30, 1997 
May 21,1997 
April 1 1, 1 9 97 
January 2,1997 
June 7,2001 ' 
April 16,200 1 
January 22,2001 
December 18,2000 
June 30,2000 
April 5,2000 
December 22,1999 
October 13, 1398 
February 4, 1998 
December 24, 1997 
August 19,1997 
June 26,1997 
February 11,1997 
Source: FCC (2003~). 
and certain other services were set at artificially high levels to provide implicit 
subsidies to support the objective of universal service. 
Tfie historical method of promoting subscribership raised subsidies through 
taxing of traffic-sensitive services through the imposition of the federal, and in 
some cases state, common carrier line charges and was based on implicit and 
hidden subsidies. The historical method of raising subsidies for universal ser- 
vice compares poorly with the economically efficient method for a number of 
reasons. First, the historical subsidy is not explicit. Therefore, it is unclear who 
is subsidizing whom. For example, in the traditional regime, a rural customer 
who makes a significant number of toll calls in a high-cost area may not be sub- 
sidized in net terns. Second, the traditional mechanism is not targeted to those 
subscribers who require the subsidy. Instead, the local-exchange carrier receives 
the subsidy for serving all consumers regardless of their ability to pay the full 
cost, even if they live in an area where costs do not exceed revenues. Third, the 
burden of universal service is borne by inter- and intra-LATA toll users, rather 
than being funded broadly, thereby introducing inefficiencies in the provision 
of those services. Fourth, the traditional system is not competitively neutral be- 
cause the benefits of the current system inure only to the incumbent local- 
exchange carrier and not to any of their potential competitors. Ths  system not 
only inlxbits the introduction of competition in the local exchange (because the 
subsidies flow to the incumbent local-exchange carrier instead of to the car- 
rier chosen by the consumer) but also may bestow unwarranted benefits on the 
incumbent local-exchange carrier to the extent the subsidies are inflated above 
amounts necessary to provide basic universal service at cost. 
The 1996 act introduced fundamental changes in the structure of tele- 
communications markets in the United States. The most important thrust of 
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the Telecommunications Act is its goal of establishing competition in all 
telecommunications markets. Competition generally drives prices closer to 
cost and imposes a strict discipline. As a result, and once competition takes 
hold, the prior implicit method of subsidization would no longer be viable. 
The act explicitly rejects such a process by requiring universal service support 
to be explicit (Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 254[e]) and by forbid- 
ding the continued use of universal service subsidies to cross-subsidize com- 
petitively provided services (sec. 254[k]). 
The 1996 act aims to "preserve and advance universal service" (sec. 
254[b]). This translates to the following: 
high quality at low rates 
access to advanced services in all states 
access in rural and high cost areas at prices comparable to those in other areas 
service supported by "equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions" by 
"all providers of telecommunications services" 
specific and predictable mechanisms to raise the required funds 
access to advanced telecommunications services for schools, health care 
facilities, and libraries 
Regulatory policy that explicitly deviates from the market outcome in the 
market for subscription creates a number of complex questions. Among them 
are who will be subsidized, by how much, by whom, and how the money will 
actually flow from the subsidizers to the subsidized. If these issues are not re- 
solved in an efficient manner, economic distortions ("secondary distortions") 
may result that may be more significant than their original cause. For exam- 
ple, if the subsidy is extracted from subscribers of a single service, demand 
for that service will necessarily be impacted in ways that would not be con- 
sistent with the goals of the 1996 act. On the other hand, an efficient solution 
to these questions can guarantee that no further distortions are created by uni- 
versal service, that is, no distortions over and above the original distortion cre- 
ated by the decision to maximize subscribership. 
Funding for universal service should be achieved in a manner that is both 
efficient and competitively neutral. An economically efficient universal ser- 
vice fund should conform to the following criteria: 
All subsidies to promote universal service should be made explicit. 
Universal service should be funded broadly. 
Universal service subsidies should be targeted narrowly. 
Universal service should be achieved in a competitively neutral fashion. 
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The existence and operation of any universal service fund should minimize 
distortions to other telecommunications services. 
Subsidized consumers should be served in the most efficient way possible. 
These characteristics are embodied in the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
The act specifies that universal service subsidies should be made explicit 
(Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 254[e]), funded broadly (sec. 254[d]), 
and achieved in a competitively neutral fashion (sec. 254[b]). This framework 
minimizes to the maximum extent possible the problem of secondary digtor- 
tions identified earlier in this chapter. 
The Failure of the 1996 Act and the 
Current Wave of Mergers 
Congress made a crucial miscalculation of the incentive of RBOCs to open 
their local networks to competition so that they would be rewarded with entry 
in long distance. In the summer of 1996, the RBOCs decided to delay entry of 
their local networks to competition as long as possible, even if that would lead 
to delay of their entry into the long-distance service market. 
The various legal challenges have derailed the implementation process of 
the act and have increased uncertainty in the telecommunications sector. In the 
absence of reasonable final prices, given the uncertainty of the various legal 
proceedings, and without final resolution on the issues of nonrecurring costs 
and the electronic interface for switching local-service customers across carri- 
ers, entry in the local exchange through leasing of unbundled network elements 
has been slow. Moreover, entry in the retailing part of the business through total 
service resale has been minimal, since the wholesale discounts have Seen small. 
In the absence of entry in the local exchange market as envisioned by the 
act, the major long-distance companies are buying other companies that give 
them some access to the local market. For example, MCI has merged with 
WorldCom, which had just merged with Brooks Fiber and MFS, which, in turn, 
also own some infrastructure in local-exchange markets. MCI-WorldCom has 
focused on the Internet, having acquired Internet backbone provider UUNET 
as part of MFS, and the business long-distance market.lg WorldCom proposed 
a merger with Sprint. The merger was stopped by both the U.S. Department 
of Justice and the Competition Committee of the European Union. The De- 
partment of Justice had reservations about potential dominance of the merged 
company in the market for global telecommunications services. The European 
Union had objections about potential dominance of the Internet backbone by 
the merged company.20 In June 2002 WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bank- 
ruptcy protection after a series of revelations about accounting irregularities; 
as of this writing, the full effects of these events on the future of WorldCom 
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and the entire industry are still open. MCI (WorldCom having reverted to its 
old name) has emerged from bankruptcy, and competitors are concerned that 
MCI will be a formidable competitor with no debts. 
AT&T acquired TCG, whch owned local-exchange infrastructure that 
reached business customers. AT&T unveiled an ambitious strategy of reach- 
ing consumers' homes by using cable television wires for the "last mile." With 
this end in mind, AT&T bought TCI with the intent of converting the TCI 
cable access to an interactive broadband, voice, and data telephone link to res- 
idences. AT&T had also entered in an agreement with Time Warner to use its 
cable connection in a way similar to TCI's, and in April 1999 AT&T outbid 
Comcast and acquired MediaOne, the cable spin-off of U.S. West. 
TCI cable at the time reached 35 percent of U.S. households. Together 
with Time Warner and MediaOne, AT&T could reach a bit more than 50 per- 
cent of U.S. households. Without access to unbundled network elements to 
reach all residential customers, AT&T had to find another way to reach the re- 
maining U.S. households. The provision of telephony, Internet access, broad- 
band, data, and two-way video services exclusively over cable lines in the "last 
mile" requires significant technical advances, significant conversion of the pres- 
ent cable networks, and an investment of at least $5 billion (some say $30 bil- 
lion) just for the conversion of the cable network to two-way switched services. 
Moreover, there is some inherent uncertainty in such a conversion, which has 
not always been successful in the past. Thus it was an expensive and uncertain 
proposition for AT&T, but, at the same time, it was one of the few remaining 
options of entry in the local exchange. 
Facing tremendous pressure from financial markets, slow cable conver- 
sion, and a steep reduction in long-distance revenues, AT&T decided on a vol- 
untary breakup into a wireless unit, a cable TV unit, and a long-distance and 
local service company that retained the name AT&T and the symbol "T" on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Before the breakup, financial markets tended 
to underestimate the value of AT&T by looking at it only as a long-distance 
company. After the breakup, the cable part of AT&T was bought with by 
Comcast, and since then Comcast has generally not tried to attract new cable 
telephony customers using the AT&T technology. 
Attempts by the RBOCs to maximize their foothold, looking forward to 
the time when they would be allowed to provide long-distance service in all 
states, include Southwestern Bell' s acquisition of Pacific Bell and Ameritech 
and Bell Atlantic's merger with NYNEX, despite some antitrust objections. 
Southwestern Bell also bought Southern New England Telephone, one of the 
few companies that, as an independent (not part of AT&T at divestiture), was 
not bound by restrictions imposed under the modified final judgment and had 
already entered into long distance. Bell Atlantic has merged with GTE, creating 
Verizon. Thus the eight large local exchange carriers of 1984 (seven RBOCs 
and GTE) have been reduced to only four: Verizon, BellSouth, Southwestern 
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Bell, and U.S. West. U.S. West recently merged with Qwest. The smallest one 
left, BellSouth, is widely reported to be a takeover or merger target. 
A crucial crossmedia merger occurred with the acquisition of Time 
Warner by AOL at the height of AOL' s stock price. The merger was achieved 
with the requirement that AOLITime Warner allow independent Internet ser- 
vice providers access to its cable monopoly for broadband services. Synergies 
and new joint products failed to materialize at AOLITime Warner. AOL has 
already been dropped from the trading symbol of the merged company, and 
there is wide speculation that AOL will be divested. 
The Telecom Meltdown of 
2000 to 2003 
The present crisis in telecommunications arose out of an incorrect prediction 
of the speed of expansion of the Internet and therefore of the demand for all 
the new markets "living" on the Internet. It was widely believed that the In- 
ternet would grow at 400 percent in terms of transmitted bits per year. In ret- 
rospect, it is clear that for the years 2000 and 2001 growth of only 100 percent 
was realized. Of course, it is always difficult to pin down the growth rate in 
early stages of an exponential network expansion, and the Internet was grow- 
ing at 400 percent a year when the original predictions were made. The rate 
of growth slowed down in the number of new hosts connected, however, and 
since no new "killer application" ,that required a lot of bandwidth was un- 
veiled, the rate of growth in bits transferred also slowed down. This is despite 
the fast growth of transfers of bits in peer-to-peer (P2P) transfers of files 
among computers, mainly songs in MP3 format, popularized by Napster and 
still going strong even after Napster has been practically closed down.21 
Based on the optimistic prediction of Internet growth, there was tremen- 
dous investment in Internet transport and routing capacity. Moreover, because 
capital markets were liberal in providing funds, a number of companies in- 
vested in and deployed more telecommunications equipment than would be 
prudent, given their present market share. This was done for strategic reasons, 
essentially in an attempt to gain market share in the process of the rapid ex- 
pansion of the Internet. 
Once the growth prediction was revised downward, the immediate effect 
was a significant reduction in orders and in investment in fiber-optic, switch- 
ing, and router equipment. Before mahng significant new investments, 
telecommunications service companies are waiting for higher utilization rates 
of their existing capacity as the Internet expands. There is presently a tem- 
porary but significant overcapacity of Internet transmission capacity in the 
United States. As mentioned earlier, since it is easy to run the Internet back- 
bone as a long-distance network, the significant overcapacity of the Internet 
backbone, combined with new investment and overcapacity of traditional long- 
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distance networks, has led to significant pressure and reductions of long- 
distance prices. Thus the incorrect prediction of the Internet expansion has had 
negative repercussions not only in Internet-based business but also in the long- 
distance business and in the market for telecommunications equipment. 
Internet Telephony a n d  Regulatory Breakdown 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not legislate any framework for the 
most revolutionary of all current innovations in telecommunications, Internet 
telephony, or more precisely Internet protocol-based telephony, more gener- 
ally known as "voice-over IF." This is despite the emergence of IP (internet 
protocol) telephony as the favorite mode of operation of new telecommunica- 
tions networks, such as those built by Qwest and Level 3, as well as the required 
conversion of traditional telecommunications networks, such as ilT&T's. 
Digitization of telecommunication services imposes price arbitrage on 
the bits of information that are carried by the telecommunications network, 
leading to the elimination of price discrimination between voice and data ser- 
vices. Elimination of such price discrimination can, in turn, lead to dramatic 
reductions in the price of voice calls, precipitating significant changes in mar- 
ket structure. These changes were first evident on the Internet, a ubiquitous 
network of applications based on the transmission control and Internet proto- 
cols (TCP/IP). Internet-based telecommunications are based on packet switch- 
ing. There are two modes of operation: a time-delay mode, in which there is a 
guarantee that the system will do whatever it can to deliver all packets, and a 
real-time mode, in whch packets can be lost without possibility of recovery. 
Many telecommunications services do not have a real-time requirement, 
so applications that "live" on the Internet can easily accommodate them. For 
example, a number of companies currently provide facsimile services on the 
Internet, all or part of the transport of the fax taking place over the Internet. 
Although the Internet was not intended to be used in real-time telecommuni- 
cations, despite the loss of packets telecommunications companies presently 
use the Internet to complete ordinary voice telephone calls. Voice telecom- 
munications service started on the Internet as computer-to-computer calls. In 
1995 Internet telecommunications companies started offering termination of 
calls on the public switched network. In 1996 firms started offering Internet 
calling that originated and terminated on the public switched telecommunica- 
tions network ("PSTN), that is, from and to the regular customers' phone ap- 
pliances. The last two transitions became possible with the introduction of 
PSTN-Internet interfaces and switches by Lucent and others. 
Traditional telephony keeps a channel of fixed bandwidth open for the 
duration of a call. Internet calls are packet based. Because transmission is 
based on packet transport, IP telephony can utilize bandwidth more efficiently 
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by varying in real time the amount of it used by a call. But because IP tele- 
phony utilizes Internet real-time mode, there is no guarantee that all the pack- 
ets of a voice transmission will d v e  at the destination. 
Internet telephony providers use sophisticated voice sampling methods 
to decompose and reconstitute voice so that packet losses do not make a sig- 
nificant audible difference. Since such methods are by their nature imperfect, 
the quality and fidelity of an Internet call depends crucially on the percentage 
of packets that are lost in transmission and transport. 
This, in turn, depends on other factors, including the allocation of Inter- 
net bandwidth (pipeline) to the phone call, the number of times the message 
is transmitted, and the number ("hops") of routers over which the phone call 
passes. Internet-based telecommunications services pose a serious threat to 
traditional telecommunications service providers, including long-distance ser- 
vice, international service, and local service providers. In the present U.S. reg- 
ulatory structure, a call to an Internet service provider that originates from a 
computer (or terminates to a computer) is not charged an access charge by the 
local-exchange carrier. This can lead to substantial savings owing to the in- 
flated access fees charged by .local-exchange carriers. 
Computer-to-computer Internet telephony has been available since 1998 
but has not been widely used except for international calls, especially in coun- 
tries where international rates are astronomical (see Garcia-Murillo 2003). 
However, a number of competitors, including AT&T, have recently entered 
the voice-over IP telephony market, attempting to substitute traditional local 
telephone service with IP telephony over a cable television or digital sub- 
scriber line (DSL) Internet connection. These companies provide appliances 
that look and feel like traditional phones and, because they deliver all calls 
over the Internet, have low prices. 
In s = q ,  dthough the Internet was not created for real-time interaction, 
its user datagram protocol (UDP) mode has been used for voice t e l eco~un ica -  
tions (Internet telephony). Internet telephony will mature as the quality of routers 
and the meshing of the IP database with the U.S. phone-numbering system im- 
prove. As Internet telephony improves in quality and Internet phone calls become 
widely available, artificially high prices of voice calls will not be sustainable be- 
cause of arbitrage in the bits. This will cause a major problem of regulatory break- 
down in whch it is likely that major telecommunications companies will ask for 
regulation of the Internet so that voice-call prices do not collapse. 
The Coming World 
The intent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to promote competi- 
tion and the public interest. It will be a significant failure of the U.S. political, 
legal, and regulatory systems if the interests of entrenched monopolists, rather 
than the public interest as expressed by Congress, dictate the future of the U.S. 
telecommunications sector. The market structure in the telecommunications 
sector two years from now will depend crucially on the resolution of the local- 
exchange carriers' legal challenges to the 1996 Telecommunications Act and 
its final implementati~n.~~ At the time of this writing (June 2004), the prospects 
for competition in the local exchange in the manner anticipated by the 1996 
act are bleak. The Appeals Court in Washngton, D.C., has thrown out sub- 
stantial parts of the triennial review order of the FCC (United States Telecom 
Association v. FCC, no. 00-1012, decided March 2, 2004), which defined a 
framework for continuing leasing of unbundled network elements by RBOCs. 
The solicitor general and the FCC decided not to appeal this decision to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not intervene, and now cost-based 
leasing of unbundled network elements is likely to be quickly phased out, and 
the RBOCs will be allowed to charge monopoly prices for unbundled network 
elements, resulting in a classic vertical price squeeze of entrants in the local 
exchange who lease unbundled network elements. Facing an imminent verti- 
cal price squeeze by the RBOCs and the increasing sale of "buckets" of corn- 
bined local and long-distance minutes, which it would not be able to match in 
the vertical price squeeze situation, on July 22, 2004, AT&T decided to stop 
marketing both local and long-distance services to residential customers. Thus 
the 1996 act's vision of competition in the local exchange through leasing of 
unbundled network elements essentially is dead. As wireless service is still not 
of the same quality as traditional fixed service, the only significant challenge 
to the RBOCs7 dominant (and, in many states, near monopoly) position in the 
residential and small-business market is voice-over IP, and there is much 
uncertainty over the viability of competition based on voice-over IP. 
AT&T's decision to stop marketing long distance to residential customers 
because of the leveraging of the RBOCs' dominance of the local market is ex- 
actly the type of undesirable event that was not supposed to happen as a con- 
sequence of allowing RBOCs to compete in the long-distance market. Thus 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has failed in its fundamental goals. First, 
competition in local markets through leasing of incumbents' networks did not 
materialize to a sufficient extent before it was abruptly killed by regulatory ac- 
tion. Second, the premature entry of RBOCs in long distance allowed them to 
implement a vertical price squeeze on local entrants, driving the largest one, 
AT&T, out of the local market. Third, the liberalization of regulatory pricing 
rules on RBOCs allowed them to sell buckets of combined minutes of local 
and long-distance service, thereby implementing a vertical price squeeze with 
such force that even marketing stand-alone long distance to residential cus- 
tomers became unprofitable for the largest provider of residential long- 
distance services, AT&T. The failure of the goals of the 1996 act is immense. 
Residential and small-business customers are likely to be significantly harmed 
by this enormous regulatory failure to protect them from mono.poly. 
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Already, we have seen a series of mergers leading to the remonopoliza- 
tion of local telecommunications. As the combinations of former RBOCs have 
been approved for long distance in all states, we see a reconstitution of the old 
AT&T monopoly (without the present AT&T). We have also seen significant 
integration in the cable industry as a result of the acquisitions and eventual di- 
vestitures of cable companies by AT&T. 
The local telephone companies have already entered the long-distance 
market without earlier significant decreases of their market shares in local 
markets. Local telephone companies have merged to expand their customer 
base and become stronger competitors in the next battle among carriers that 
sell both local and long-distance services. Twenty years after the government 
broke up the longstanding Ma Bell monopoly, the remonopolization of 
telecommunications is almost here. 
Computers are likely to play a bigger role as telephone appliances and in 
running intermediate-size networks that will compete with local-exchange 
carriers and intensify the arbitrage among interexchange carriers. Computer- 
based telephone interfaces will become the norm. Firms that have significant 
market share in computer interfaces and computer operating systems, such as 
Microsoft, may play a significant role in telephony.23 Hardware manufactur- 
ers, especially firms like Cisco, Intel, and 3Com, that make switches and local 
networks will play a much more central role in telephony. Internet telephony 
(voice, data, and broadband) is expected to grow fast. 
Finally, I expect that, slowly but steadily, telecommunications will drift 
away from the technical standards of the signaling-system seven established 
by AT&T before its breakup. As different methods of transmission and switch- 
ing gain a foothold, and as new interfaces become available, wars over techni- 
cal standards are likely.24 This will further transform telecommunications from 
the traditional quiet landscape of regulated utilities to the mad-dash world of 
software and computer manufacturing. This change will create significant busi- 
ness opportunities for entrants and impose significant challenges on traditional 
telecommunications carriers. 
Notes 
1. For example, if the production technology has such high fixed costs that it is 
clear that only one firm will survive in the marketplace, resulting in a natural 
monopoly, regulation can be used to stop the monopolist from charging the high 
monopoly price. 
2. Often, market interactions that can be modeled as economic games have multi- 
ple equilibriums, where each equilibrium is defined by a number of firms or in- 
dividuals talung the same or similar actions. Then intervention by a regulatory 
body can coordinate the actions of firms or individuals, resulting in a more ben- 
eficial outcome. For example, cars can be driven on the left or the right side of 
the street, and, in principle, there is no particular advantage to an equ~librium in 
which all cars are on the left or all cars are on the right; but there are consider- 
able disadvantages if some cars go on the right and some go on the left. Thus a 
regulatory body can create substantial benefits by imposing a rule whereby one 
of the two equilibriums is chosen. 
See David Gabel and David F. Weiman (1998) and Weiman and Richard C. 
Levin (1994). Occasionally, AT&T allowed interconnection to some indepen- 
dent local monopolists under the guarantee that these would not interconnect 
with any non-AT&T exchange. 
However, it should be noted that the requirement to interconnect could also have 
been imposed by antitrust authorities since the no-interconnection policy of 
AT&T was equivalent to a "refusal to deal" and thereby broke antitrust law. 
Still, there is no convincing evidence that the price for basic service is below 
cost, except possibly for some rural households. Moreover, adding households 
to the telecommunications network, even at a subsidized rate, may be desirable 
because of the network effects they produce to the rest of the consumers. Thus 
it is unclear that the provision of universal service has produced a considerable 
allocative efficiency distortion-if any. 
Even when the FCC was auctioning spectrum and approving licenses for per- 
sonal communication services (PCS) wireless services, it did not impose the 
same technical standard for wireless transmission; the result is three incompat- 
ible networks in the United States, in contrast to the single-standard global sys- 
tem for mobile communication (GSM) network in Europe. 
The telecommunications sector is regulated both by the federal government, 
through the FCC, and by all states, typically through a public utilities commis- 
sion or a public service commission. Usually a public utility commission also 
regulates electricity. 
For a detailed exposition of the issues in this case, see Roger G. No11 and Bruce 
Owen (1989). 
These were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Bell, South- 
western Bell, and U.S. West. 
MCI merged with WorldCom, which had earlier expanded its original LDDS 
network and had acquired the Internet backbone of UUNET. 
This is on a relative scale over time, since the carriers do not disclose actual 
price-to-cost margins. 
Origination and termination of calls are extremely lucrative services. Access has 
an average cost (in most locations) of $0.002 per minute. Its regulated prices 
vary. The national average in 2001 was $0.0169 per minute. Such pricing im- 
plies a profit rate of 745 percent. Access charges reform is one of the key de- 
mands of the procompetitive forces in the current deregulation process. 
However, non-RBOC local-exchange monopolists, such as GTE, had been tra- 
ditionally allowed to provide long-distance service and were not restricted by 
the modified final judgment. 
In FCC (1 996), the FCC and state regulatory commissions have interpreted these 
words to mean total element long-run incremental cost, wfuch is the fonvard- 
looking, long-run (minimized) economic cost of an unbundled element and in- 
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cludes the competitive return on capital (see Gregg 2001 for a recent survey of 
UNE prices). 
15. The implementation of the 1996 act started with the FCC's "First Report and 
Order" (see FCC 1996). 
16. The nationwide percentage of end-user lines served over facilities owned by 
competitive local-exchange carriers (3.4 percent) is derived by dividing the 
number of lines owned by competitive local-exchange carriers nationwide (FCC 
2003a, table 10) by the total number of lines nationwide (FCC 2003a, table 6). 
17. In contrast, 22 percent of reported incumbent local-exchange carriers' switched 
access lines served such customers. 
18. Avoiding a vertical price squeeze of long-distance competitors, such as MCI, 
was a key rationale for the 1981 breakup of AT&T in the long-distance division 
that kept the AT&T name and the seven RBOCs that remained local monopo- 
lists in local service, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Also see Nicholas 
Economides (1998; 1999). 
19. The MCI-WorldCom merger was challenged by the European Union Competi- 
tion Committee, the Department of Justice, and GTE on the grounds that the 
merged company would have a large market share of the Internet backbone and 
could sequentially target, degrade interconnection, and lull its backbone rivals. 
Despite a lack of an economically meaningful definition of the Internet "back- 
bone," the unlikelihood that MCI would have such an incentive because any 
degradation would also hurt its customers, and the unlikelihood that such degra- 
dation would be feasible, the Competition Committee of the European Union 
ordered MCI to divest itself of all its Internet business, including its retail busi- 
ness, where it was never alleged that the merging companies had any monopoly 
power. MCI's Internet business was sold to Cable and Wireless, the MCI- 
WorldCom merger was finalized, and MCI-WorldCom is using its UUNET sub- 
sidiary to spearhead its way in the Internet. 
20. The merged company proposed to divest Sprint's backbone. The European 
Union's objections were based on WorldCom's market share of about 35 per- 
cent in the Internet backbone market. The European Union used a peculiar the- 
ory predicting that "tipping7' and dominance to monopoly would occur starting 
from this market share because WorldCom would introduce incompatibilities 
into Internet transmission and drive all competitors out of the market. Time 
proved that none of these concerns were credible. 
21. Clearly, the Internet provides a superior way of distribution of music in dgitized 
form. However, because of concerns that the music will be freely downloaded, 
the recording industry has avoided using this distribution process and is cur- 
rently suing hundreds of inlviduals for allowing digitized music to be down- 
loaded from their computers. Distribution of music and video in digitized form 
could significantly increase the amount of bits traveling on the Internet, but the 
present copyright dispute makes it unlikely that this will happen any time soon. 
22. In one of the major challenges, GTE and a number of RBOCs appealed the 1996 
FCC rules (among others) on pricing guidelines to the Eighth Circuit. The plain- 
tiffs won the appeal; the FCC appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled on 
January 25, 1999. The plaintiffs claimed (among other things) that the FCC's 
rules on the definition of unbundled network elements were flawed; that the FCC 
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"default prices" for leasing of unbundled network elements were so low that 
they amounted to confiscation of incumbent local-exchange carriers' property; 
and that the FCC's "pick and choose" rule, allowing a carrier to demand access 
to any inhvidual interconnection, service, or network element arrangement on 
the same terms and conditions the local-exchange carrier has given anyone else 
in an approved local competition entry agreement without having to accept the 
agreement's other provisions, would deter the "voluntarily negotiated agree- 
ments." The Supreme Court ruled for the FCC in all these points, thereby elim- 
inating a major challenge to the implementation of the act. 
23. Microsoft owns a share of WebTV, has invested in Qwest and AT&T, and has 
broadband agreements with a number of domestic and foreign local-exchange 
carriers but does not seem to plan to control a telecommunications company. 
24. A significant failure of the FCC has been its silence in defining technical stan- 
dards and promoting compatibility. Even when the FCC had a unique opportu- 
nity to define such standards in PCS telephony (since it could define the terms 
while it auctioned electromagnetic spectrum), it allowed a number of incom- 
patible standards to coexist for PCS service. This led directly to a weakening of 
competition and higher prices, as wireless PCS consumers have to buy a new 
appliance to &gate across providers and are unable to set up service with more 
than one provider using the same appliance. 
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